



# Impacts of Space Weather on Department of Defense Operations and Systems

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***Integrity ★ Service ★ Excellence***

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


# Space Weather - Flares and Radio Bursts



Stephen White, RVBXS

- Flares: **immediate impact on HF radio comms** due to ionization in D layer by X-rays
- Long-term impact by UV-EUV heating of the upper atmosphere, **increases drag on satellites**: measured by F10.7
- Radio bursts: **can knock out GPS, interfere with comms, radar**
- Large event of 2006 Dec 06: knocked out GPS for 20 minutes, affected cell phone reception, occurred **after** impulsive phase of flare. An issue for increased use of **UAVs, aircraft landing**.
- Solar interference is important for systems with wide beams
- High microwave, mm frequencies also see large bursts
- Flare prediction is an active area, helped by **new ability to sense far-side activity**






# Space Weather - Coronal Mass Ejections



Stephen White, RVBXS

- Coronal mass ejections (CMEs): large eruptions of mass at 1000 km/s, generally associated with flares, **take 1-3 days to arrive at Earth**, generate magnetospheric storms.
- Need to know **whether they will strike Earth**, and what the magnetic field orientation is.
- Compression of magnetosphere can affect **power systems, radiation belts, ionospheric communication** conditions.
- May also be progenitors for **solar energetic particles**
- Solar wind: “corotating interacting regions” occur when there is a transition at the Earth’s magnetosphere in the type of solar wind hitting it, can cause **storms and “killer electrons”**






# Space Weather - Solar Energetic Particles



Stephen White, RVBXS

- Energetic particle events: protons with energies  $\sim 1$  GeV, **radiation hazard for astronauts and polar flights**, affect **satellite electronics**, polar cap absorption in ionosphere
- Can come from flares or CMEs, **can arrive within 10 minutes of a flare**
- $\mathbf{v} \times \mathbf{B}$  forces in geomagnetic field control entry of SEPs: **more important at poles than equator**.
- Largest events (ground level enhancements, or “GLEs”) are seen by neutron monitors: **high-energy protons produce neutrons** by nuclear interactions in the atmosphere, can reach detectors on the ground.
- Prediction: similar to flares, but **not all large flares produce SEPs**








# Orbital Drag Predictions and Solar Activity



Chin Lin, RVBXI

### Solar Activity Predictions



- Current model neutral density error  $\sim 15\%$  during geomagnetic quiet times &  $> 50\%$  during magnetic storms
- Data assimilative physical model will reduce orbit prediction error






# AFSPC 72 Hour Prediction Errors Due to Geomagnetic Activity



Chin Lin, RVBXI

Compares orbit predictions for geomagnetically quiet vs disturbed periods in 2005



- For HASDM:
  - Improve storm formulation and prediction capability
- Next-Generation Models
  - Realistic heating inputs
  - Physical Model development
  - New high resolution thermosphere data and data assimilation capability






# Ionospheric Space Weather Impacts



Odile de la Beaujardiere, RVBXP

- **Scintillation - Loss of communication**

- During magnetic storms, scintillation can occur at all latitudes (during quiet times, scintillation will occur mostly at high and low latitudes)
- Scintillation occurs during quiet and active times, intensity depends on F10.7
- Impacts on systems




- Scintillation can disrupt sat comm and cut HF options
- Real-time targeting depends on “instant” communication
- Higher bandwidth systems have increased vulnerability

- **Scintillation - Degraded navigation**

- Ionosphere disturbances degrade GPS systems
- Impacts on DoD systems
  - DoD relies on a multitude of GPS receivers
  - Collateral damage depends on accurate precision guided munitions

DMSP F15 Evening Sector EPBs 2000




During solar max, in Spring, severe scintillation seen 75% of nights at longitudes that include Africa and Middle East



# Ionospheric Space Weather Impacts



- **Degraded Geolocation, loss of accuracy in Electron Density Profiles (EDP) and Total Electron Content (TEC)**
  - Large gradients in electron density profiles cause geolocation errors
  - Surveillance & intel applications become difficult
- **Loss of Communications at high latitudes from polar cap absorption events**
- **Radio bursts directly interfere with GPS, Comm and radar systems**
  - False returns, false targeting, blinding surveillance radars and multiple HF systems
  - SATCOM also impacted due to signal interference and loss
  - GPS affected




Storm-enhanced density signature in TEC (Nov 20, 2003). Strong plasma density gradients are observed

Don Thompson, RVBXI




# Ionospheric Space Weather Impacts

- **Satellite sensors blinded by energetic particle events, then rapid degradation**
  - Micro channel plates (MCP) saturated by MeV and GEV particles that impact them directly
    - Example: DMSP particle detectors
  - MCP degrade rapidly from high fluxes – can be inoperable after the storm



Drawn on Thu Sep 08 16:54:35 2011



Drawn on Thu Sep 08 17:03:25 2011

During a normal pass, electron and ion spectra across a polar crossing, from SSJ5 instrument on DMSP

During energetic particle event, MCP counts high in both channels -- instrument blinded by high energy particles (~5 such events/solar cycle)





# Sources and Types of Satellite Anomalies



Dale Ferguson, RVBXR

- **Sources**
  - **Spacecraft Surface Charging**
    - May cause electrostatic discharges (ESDs) and arcing on solar arrays, power cables
    - Caused by electrons of 5-50 keV in GEO, 2-20 keV in PEO, or high voltage arrays in LEO
  - **Deep Dielectric Charging**
    - May cause arcing internally to spacecraft
    - Caused by total dose of electrons of 200 keV-3 MeV, protons of > 10 MeV, or prompt SEPs or X-rays
    - Single Event Upsets (SEUs) caused by ionization trail of single high energy particles in sensitive electronics
- **Types**
  - **Transient effects** (bit flips in electronics, EMI, causing spurious commands or software upsets)
  - **Permanent damage** (arcs, ESDs, and MCP saturation, may damage electronics, and/or cause power cabling or solar array failure)

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# A Few Anomalies and Their Probable Causes



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- **Tempo-2 and PAS-6 (1997) – sustained arcs from geomagnetic substorm ESDs**
- **ADEOS-2 (1994) – micrometeoroid strike during auroral charging event**
- **Galaxy 15 (2010) – ESD caused electronics problem coming out of eclipse during severe geomagnetic substorm**
- **DMSP-15 (2011) – computer upset after large total internal dose from X-class flare X-rays**
- **Echostar 129 (2011) – temporary pointing/positioning loss after huge peak in GOES > 2 MeV (“killer”) electrons**



# Space Situational Awareness



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- **A key goal for DoD – 2010 National Space Policy**
- **DoD must determine whether anomalies are due to the Space Weather or to hostile actions**
- **Operations may be affected by efforts to prevent space weather-related outages**
- **DoD goals – real-time anomaly resolution, 72 hour predictive space weather capability**



# When DoD Satellites Fail due to Charging – Very Dangerous Periods



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- **Eclipse Seasons** (Spring and Fall equinoxes) – satellites charge more in eclipse (no photoemission)
- **Time of Day** – anomalies prefer the morning-side after eclipse (differential discharging from photoemission)
- **High and Extended Max Kp** – Days of  $K_p > \sim 6$  and  $K_p \text{ Sum} > 35.0$  are most dangerous
- **Minutes to hours after SEP events**
- **2-5 days following a CME on the Sun**



# How to Design to Prevent Space Weather Charging-Related Anomalies



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- Harden all vital electronics and place in well-shielded Faraday cage
- Coat all surfaces with grounded conductors
- No ungrounded or unshielded wires (Galaxy 15 failure mechanism, NASA TP-2361)
- Design for more secondary electron emission and less photoemission (per Shu Lai, 2011, “Spacecraft Charging”)
- Design and test arrays to prevent ESDs and sustained arcs (Tempo-2 failure mechanism, NASA-STD-4005, NASA-HDBK-4006, ISO 11221)
- Design spacecraft to prevent deep dielectric discharges (NASA-HDBK-4002A)
- Fly charge monitors and charging mitigation systems

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# Operations to Mitigate Space Weather-Related Anomalies



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- Upload software that resets after Single Event Upsets (SEUs)
- Monitor space environments and charging predictions
- When severe Space Weather is predicted, turn off sensitive electronics (thrusters, focal-plane arrays, MCPs, etc.)
- Shunt arrays (or feather into the wake) when severe charging is likely and/or when coming out of eclipse