

Impact of Ionospheric Scintillation on Commercial GNSS Timing Receivers

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
IPSC - Institute for the Protection and
Security of the Citizen

Ispra - Italy

<http://ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>

<http://www.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>

- Background
- GNSS is a Critical Infrastructure
- Facilities
- Space weather related activities:
 - Assessment of the resilience of timing receivers
 - Monitoring of ionospheric scintillation
 - EM modelling of the ionospheric scintillations
- Concluding Remarks



- IPSC is currently investigating the vulnerabilities of GNSS systems to:
 - anthropogenic interference sources (e.g., DBV-T, RFI, ...)
 - natural interference sources (e.g., space weather)
- Ground critical infrastructures are vulnerable (e.g., those relying on GNSS-based services for precise timing and synchronization)
- Country-wide fixed and wireless networks (i.e., internet), the power grid (PMU), banking services, stock markets (time stamping with 5 ms accuracy), and sea, air, rail and road transportation networks,...

<p>VULNERABILITY AS OF THE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE RELYING ON GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS</p> <p>Final Report</p> <p>August 29, 2001</p> <p>Prepared by</p> <p>U. S. Department of Transportation</p> <p>US: Aug 2001</p>	<p>JRC Scientific and Technical Reports</p> <p>The Royal Academy of Engineering</p> <p>Global Navigation Satellite System Reliance and Vulnerability</p> <p>Radio Frequency Interference on Global Navigation Satellite Systems</p> <p>Matthias Wildemeersch, Joaquim Fortuny-Montoliu EC Joint Research Centre, Security Technology</p> <p>EUR 24242 EN - January 2010</p> <p>EC – Jan 2010</p> <p></p>	<p>The Royal Academy of Engineering</p> <p>Global Navigation Satellite System Reliance and Vulnerability</p> <p>UK – Mar 2010</p>	<p>Satellite Navigation & Space Weather: Understanding the Vulnerability & Building Resilience</p> <p></p> <p>US: March 2011</p> <p>American Meteorological Society Policy Workshop Report March 2011</p>
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
- GNSS should be classified as a Critical Infrastructure
- A GNSS interference geolocating and reporting system shall be deployed
- Hardening of GNSS receivers and antennas
- Establish GNSS backup systems to guarantee PNT operations (e.g, aviation)
- Establish new standards for more resilient GNSS receivers
- Quantify the impact on critical timing and synchronization services

Analysis:

- Allan Deviation, Modified Allan Deviation, RMS Time Interval Error, Max Time Interval Error: **metrics used in Telecommunications**

Tools:

- tests of professional timing receivers and GPS clocks
- experiments in conducted and radiated mode (use of an **anechoic chamber**)
- tests in free run and with difference levels of RFI




High-end time server used to provide accurate time to telecommunication networks

Tests in free run and with a CWI interference centered at the GPS L1 band

Dedicated antenna with integrated down-converter (provides additional defenses against tampering)



Without GPS





24h windows: phenomena likely related to day/night environmental changes (e.g./ temperature)

Without GPS, time drifts are present in the collected frequency measurements

Performance quickly degrades when using local oscillators of low quality

With GPS






$$\sigma_A = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2(N-1)} \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} (y[n] - y[n-1])^2}$$



Average deviation between frequency measurements taken at subsequent time instants

A CWI at the L1 GPS center frequency with a power as low as **-75 dBm** is able to make the time server switch to free run mode (**GPS denial**)



When available, GPS updates significantly improve the long term stability of the frequency source


Time interval error: error committed in measuring a reference time interval with respect to an 'ideal' clock (in this case the Symmetricom 8040 Rubidium Frequency standard)



GPS updates: effective reduction of timing errors on medium to large time intervals

High-end time server, good performance in free run mode as well

Source: Stanford University



Ionospheric Range Delay result from normal signal propagation through the ionosphere.

Scintillations result from severe ionospheric signal scattering.

Amplitude Fading or signal to noise degradation are caused by solar radio bursts.

- **Scintillation = rapid fluctuations in:**

- **Phase**
- **And/or Amplitude**

$$s(t) = A(t)e^{j\phi(t)} + n(t)$$

Don't forget this!

- **S4 is a measure of amplitude scintillation**

$$S_4 = \sqrt{\frac{\text{Var} [A(t)^2]}{E [A(t)^2]^2}}$$

- **Two basic approaches considered**

1. Using C/N_0 measurements




$$C / N_0 = \frac{E[A(t)^2]}{E[n(t)^2]}$$

2. Using I/Q values from correlators


$$I + jQ = \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T c(t)A(t)e^{j\delta\phi(t)} + c(t)n(t)dt \approx \bar{A}e^{j\delta\bar{\phi}} + \eta$$

Spirent GSS8000

- Configured with same scintillation model
- All SVs configured with same S4 (same S4 from all points in the sky)
- Again receivers fed in conducted mode




Javad – C/N₀ Computation




- Left:
 - Excellent agreement again
 - Surprisingly good in fact
 - C/N₀ estimator = black box
 - Model is good


- Right:
 - “Spikes” in same places
 - Issue with detrending?



NovAtel – C/N₀ Computation




- Left:
 - Poorer agreement in this case
 - Impact of unknown C/N₀ computation algorithm
 - But, easily calibrated out









- Proposed algorithms implemented on a real-time, 24 hour scintillation monitor
- Installed at Ispra (~ 45 degrees North)




JRC Ispra Spaceweather Monitoring Station




Javad GPS Satview at JRC Ispra @ 2011-09-15, 13:57 UTC



Javad GLONASS Satview at JRC Ispra @ 2011-09-15, 13:57 UTC







- Measurement plane moves due to satellite and ionosphere disturbances displacement
- Measurement plane results are converted into time series by means of its effective velocity

- **Results, oblique incidence and anisotropic structure**

PRN6

PRN9



- The JRC has the capabilities to test GNSS receivers and GPS clocks under several scenarios such as a temporary outage or presence of RFI
- Focus of the activity is on the quantitative assessment of the impact of anthropogenic and natural interference sources
- Extensive tests conducted on 7 different GPS clocks/time servers used in the telecom sector
- The **quality of the local oscillator** determines the performance of a GPS clock in case of an temporary outage or in the presence of RFI
- Work is on-going to test receivers under amplitude scintillation, using signal generators and collecting raw IF datasets in the Equatorial region
- A phase screen model of the ionosphere will be used to create synthetic IF datasets with adjustable S4 and time decorrelation coefficients